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Abstract
Arguably,one of the most important developments in the field of applied eco-
nomics during the last decades has been the emergence of systematic policy
evaluation,withitsdistinctfocusontheestablishmentofcausality.Bycontrast
to the natural sciences, the objects of our scientific interest typically exert
some influence on their treatment status under the policy to be evaluated and
on their economic outcomes. Thus, economic policy advice can only be suc-
cessful,if it is based on an appropriate study design,experimental or observa-
tional. It will strive in societies that provide liberal access to data, accept the
merits of randomized assignment and guard the independence of research in-
stitutions.
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When speculating about the way in which economic policy advice will be con-
ducted in the future,and about the methodological basis on which it will rest,
onehastorealizefirstthatverylittleisknownabouttheactualextenttowhich
applied economic research affects public policy. This is true both within and
across countries:while it seems that different countries have established their
own individual modes of conducting research and providing policy advice,the
experiences made with these approaches are usually not compared systemat-
ically. This is all the more remarkable, as academic research in economics is
conducted in an integrated world market.Nonetheless,in some countries (e.g.
the United States) policy makers and administrators tend to demand sophis-
ticated, methodologically rigorous economic research as a basis for policy
advice, while in other countries (e.g. Germany) they even struggle with re-
searchers over side issues such as data confidentiality and the ethical basis of
social experimentation.
To leave large parts of the potential for economic policy research untapped
most likely implies substantial costs,which ultimately arise in the form of im-
plementing and retaining ineffective and wasteful policy measures. This re-
search potential,moreover,has grown tremendously,as perhaps the most im-
portant developments in the field of applied economics during the last
decades have been the emergence of systematic policy evaluation, and an in-
creasing awareness of the pitfalls associated with inadequate empirical re-
search strategies. These developments bring into focus the assessment of
causal effects: Whereas it is often the task of economists to characterize
certain economic phenomena in a thorough descriptive analysis,or to provide
a reliable forecast of future developments,the key aspect of policy evaluation
is the establishment of causality. This is far from being a trivial task, due to a
fundamental requirement faced by most applied economic research, i.e. to
answer research questions outside of a comfortable and perfectly controlled
laboratory environment.
In Germany, the emergence of systematic policy evaluation constitutes only
part of a whole range of recent changes to the market for economic policy
advice1.In fact,for a number of reasons,both the demand side and the supply
side of applied econometric research and consulting have changed tremen-
dously during the last decade. Certainly, the economic problems to be ad-
dressed have become more complex with increasingly open and interde-
pendent markets,with faster production cycles and more immediate diffusion
ofknowledge,andwithencompassingdemographicandsocietalchange,.Most
importantly, though, the increasing awareness of the limitations of gov-
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1 The role of the “large”German economic research institutes gathered in the Leibniz Associa-
tion (WGL) is discussed in Schmidt (2006).ernment interventions along with tighter public budgets have generated a
growing pressure to thoroughly evaluate the effectiveness of policy measures.
Being held more accountable than in the past, politicians and administrators
often request quantitative and reliable assessments directly after or even
before the implementation of policy measures, rather than abstract long-run
advice.
Paralleltothesechangesonthedemandsideofthemarket,thesupplysidehas
experienced dramatic alterations as well. While in the past the division of
labor between statistical offices (data collection and provision), research in-
stitutes (descriptive analyses and extrapolations based on the “current fringe”
of data), and the universities’ economics faculties (economic research)
seemed to be sensible, this organizational arrangement has been funda-
mentally challenged. First, this strict division of labor is quite counterpro-
ductive, since good policy advice requires a study design which is deeply
rooted in economic and econometric research. Second, as evidenced in the
pastbytheoftenmoderateacademicqualityoftheworkofeconomicresearch
institutesandbythelimitedrelevanceofmuchoftheuniversityresearch,what
seemed at the time as a sensible division of labor has led to sever the link
between research and policy advice.
Third, the almost complete overhaul of organizational structures, method-
ological approaches, and academic aspirations experienced by Germany’s
economic research institutes has pushed them to the forefront of applied
economicresearchinthecountry.Itiscertainlynotamerecoincidencethatre-
searchers from these institutes have accounted for a good chunk of those pub-
lications in the top journals in economics which have been written by German
scholars in recent years. At the same time, fourth, other players have entered
the market,generating a variegated set of suppliers of economic policy advice.
These new competitors are mainly university-based researchers, incentivized
to address applied “real-world” problems by shrinking financial resources,
and private consulting companies whose intellectual base has steadily im-
proved,augmenting their hands-on approach to finding solutions to problems
of organization and implementation.
Thus,overall,it is the increase in competition on the supply side that has pre-
vented individual suppliers to lean back and simply enjoy the increasing
demand for economic policy advice, and that has put weak or intellectually
stagnant players under tremendous pressure, hence improving the overall
quality of work. These developments were supported by advances in tech-
nology and recent progress in empirical methodology. On the technical side,
advances comprise the remarkable increase in the access to comprehensive
micro-level data, even in continental Europe, and the surge in computing
power available for handling large and complex data bases.More importantly,
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phasized – under the heading “identification” – the quest for both the po-
tential and the limitations of (non-experimental) empirical research, rather
than an ever increasing level of technical sophistication2.This has pushed eco-
nomics forward as an empirical science.
Against this background, the issue of identification is also a key part of this
paper, as it focuses on the evaluation of economic policy measures. The
analysis of causality, in particular the assessment of policy interventions with
respect to their effects,is one of three fundamental tasks of empirical research
in economics, and perhaps its hardest intellectual challenge. The two other
tasks are descriptive analysis and forecasting. The specific objective of eval-
uation studies in economics is the isolation of the effects of the policy inter-
vention under study to the best extent possible from the impact of all other
aspects of the economic environment. Applied research in economics has
made tremendous progress in reaching this objective and evaluations of labor
marketinterventionshaveplayedaparticularlyimportantroleincarryingthis
progress forward.It is now up to the demand side to make full use of this po-
tential for the design of better economic policy.
In the next section,I will discuss in intuitive terms the aspects that make iden-
tification problems such a tremendous intellectual challenge, characterizing
them as problems of limited observability (i.e. data availability). The third
sectiion discusses suggestions how the current state of knowledge can be
utilized to offer convincing solutions to this problem
2. Identification Problems in Economic Analysis
The key to good empirical research in economics is finding the right balance
between quantitative skill and economic expertise.Quite fundamentally,pro-
ficiency in mathematical statistics is insufficient if it is not accompanied by a
good dose of economic competence,such as identifying “what is the object of
interest?”. For instance, a particular conditional expectation (the mean of Y
given X) might be a prime candidate for empirical economic analysis, while
another (the mean of X given Y) is without any economic content.Yet,given
the data the mathematical statistician will be able to extract an estimate of
both entities. Similarly, and of equally fundamental importance, before
starting the analysis the researcher needs to assemble everything she firmly
believes to hold true, so firmly that it will not have to be questioned
throughout the analysis (“what do I know already?”).
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2 A seminal contribution to the issue of identification is Manski (1995).If this a priori knowledge were to entail every aspect of the phenomenon (in
the terminology of mathematical statistics:the complete distribution),no em-
pirical study would be necessary. At the other end of the spectrum, if no
baseline knowledge existed to rest the analysis on, an empirical study would
be impossible. Since empirical research is the attempt to learn something
about the properties of a probability distribution (or “population”) from the
repeated observation of realizations drawn from the same underlying distri-
bution (or “sample”), a minimum requirement is the assertion that indeed
(parts of) the data represent draws from the same population. Since the ul-
timate truth about such aspects can never revealed with certainty, from the
perspective of the researcher this assertion is in essence an assumption that
will not be questioned any further,a so-called identification assumption.
Typically, maintained assumptions of this sort need to go beyond this
minimum requirement, dictated by the wealth of data. It would make little
sense,for instance,to attempt the estimation of a highly non-linear relation,if
only a few data points in the sample allowed the researcher to trace it across
the relevant range of potential observations. In such cases, resorting to the
analysisofarestrictivemodel(i.e.amodelwhosepropertiesareexpressedina
limited number of parameters), for instance a linear regression model, is the
only choice. Maintaining the identifying assumption that the sample rep-
resents a population for which this restrictive model unquestionably holds,
reduces the quest for further knowledge to the estimation of the model pa-
rameters.
Empirical research cannot extract more pieces of information from the data
than the data provide – it needs so-called degrees of freedom: if several data
points “voluntarily” demonstrate a similar realization, although they are free
to differ widely,then this can be taken as a firm indication for the relevance of
this similarity. These matters of statistical inference are well understood. In
particular,we know that the confidence about the validity of approximations
to population properties rises with sample size – holding the identification as-
sumptions fixed. They are also the basis for systematic hypothesis testing –
again, maintaining the identification assumptions. Thus, at the beginning of
any empirical study one must ask what sort of questions the available sample
does allow asking (“what can I learn with some confidence?”). In theory,
sample sizes are irrelevant for the formulation of identification assumptions,
in practical applications they are not.
In addition to this trade-off between identification assumptions and questions
left open to statistical inference,many phenomena do not become observable
more precisely as the sample size increases. For instance, the conditional ex-
pectation of a random variable Y (the “outcome”) given a random variable X
(the “policy”) might not depend at all causally on the specific value of X,but
Policy Evaluation and Economic Policy Advice 7therealizationsofbothYandXmightreflectthespecificvaluesofyetanother
randomvariableZ.AnyanalysisignoringZwouldthenleadtoerroneouscon-
clusions about the causality from X to Y.If the sample does not contain infor-
mation on Z, then collecting more and more realizations of Y and X will not
help. Thus, only an identification assumption ruling out the relevance of any
other conditioning factor Z allows for the causal interpretation the researcher
is aiming at. Again, there is a trade-off involved: Imposing a correct identifi-
cation assumption allows the researcher to extract meaningful insights from
the data, but the more stringent these restrictions have to be in order to
proceed,the higher is the risk to derive completely erroneous conclusions.
Since they are the prerequisite for causal inference, identification as-
sumptions,such as ruling out any contamination by a third factor Z,cannot be
questioned any further throughout the analysis.Consequently,they can never
be subjected to any statistical test either. Instead, the researcher has to ask
herself at the outset whether she can convincingly construct an answer to the
underlying counterfactual question: “What would have happened to the
outcomeofinterestY,if–forthesameobservationunit–therealizationofthe
policyvariableXhadbeendifferentfromwhatactuallyhappened?”Sinceitis
impossible to observe different scenarios for the same observation unit in the
data,itisclearthatsomehowtheanswertothisquestionmustbederivedfrom
different experiences of different observation units.
This might or might not be possible, however, depending on the specific sit-
uation at hand. In principle, any economic researcher would cherish a sit-
uation in which the policies under study were applied exogenously to the indi-
viduals (households,enterprises,regions,etc.) whose outcomes (employment,
profits,unemploymentrates,etc.)thoseprogramsintendtoalter.Thatistosay
that neither the units under treatment nor the program administrators imple-
menting the policy were to base policy participation decisions on character-
istics of candidate participants. Then the difference between the typical
outcome for units participating in the program and units who do not par-
ticipate will provide a convincing estimate of the program effect – one would
trulycomparethecomparable.Inpractice,onewaytomeetthisrequirementis
the randomized assignment of units to treatment and control groups, respec-
tively. Many applied studies need to proceed outside of a controlled ex-
periment, though, confronting so-called observational data. In fact, in certain
cases an intelligent study design can in principle produce a non-experimental
estimate of the program effect that is similarly convincing as the experimental
ideal.
One obvious way to generate empirical evidence on program effectiveness is
touseallobservablecharacteristicsoftheindividualprogramparticipantsand
non-participantstostratifythesample,andthentoconducttheanalysiswithin
8 Christoph M. Schmidthomogeneous population strata.Yet,in practical applications,this approach is
not necessarily successful: The most important principle in the evaluation of
social policies is that the objects of our scientific interest, namely the indi-
viduals addressed by the policy,have their own minds and consequently make
their own decisions. These decisions necessarily influence the state of (ma-
terial) welfare that people experience without the policy, as well as the effect
that it exerts in case of its implementation.Thus,while in their specific lines of
research bio-engineers, pharmacologists or physicists might have to analyze
very complex mechanisms, their objects of interest, say plant or animal cells,
human organs, or photovoltaic sensors, are usually not responsible for their
own destiny. By contrast, when assessing if and how a social policy works for
the individuals it is targeted at,the social scientist usually needs to understand
first why individuals arrived at the state which the policy has been designed to
alter.The policy can only be effective,if it manages to change the behavior of
its clients in the desired direction.
If people were indeed behaving like mechanical devices,the impulses created
by a social policy could be assessed easily. One would simply administer the
treatmentimplementedbytheprogramtosometargetindividuals,whilewith-
holding it from others which are used as comparison observations. The
treatment would be exogenous in the sense discussed above. In this hypo-
thetical world, individuals would display perfect compliance with their as-
signment, i.e. target individuals would follow the prescribed treatment and
comparisons would stay out of the program or any substitute for it.Given that
both groups of people are observed in the same environment, the estimated
effect of the social policy could then be read off directly from the difference
between the outcomes of the target individuals and their comparisons. This
procedure would mimic the research strategy that natural scientists pursue in
the laboratory.In the reality addressed by social policies,though,people very
well have a say in their own actions.
Specifically, in the social sciences, even people who appear observationally
equivalent might be quite different in aspects that directly pertain to the
outcome under study, but that remain hidden to the researcher (e.g. moti-
vation, work ethic, etc.). These characteristics might also influence the com-
pliance with the original assignment into target and comparison groups. In
practice, treatment under a social program is an offer that has to be taken up
by targeted individuals, and in the absence of access to the social policy com-
parison individuals might seek out alternative ways to improve their situation.
Thus,theindividualschoosingtoparticipateintheprogrammightbequitedif-
ferent – as regards characteristics not observed by the researcher – from those
whodonotmakethisdecision.Takingthelatterasacomparisongroupforthe
former might therefore be a problematic strategy for estimating the effect of
the policy. Basically all recent advances in the econometric literature on
Policy Evaluation and Economic Policy Advice 9program evaluation have aimed at developing methods to properly account
for this unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. coming close to estimating the “true”
counterfactual outcome.
3. Elements of Rigorous Program Evaluation
Rigorous program evaluation emerged as a major innovation in the imple-
mentation of economic and social policy during the second half of the last
century3.Itisnowwidelyrecognizedthatadvancingthestateofknowledgeon
which programs have worked in the past, and which have not, enables policy
makers and administrators to make informed predictions about outcomes of
futureinterventions,andtodesigntheirpoliciesaccordingly.Thus,bypointing
outthepotentialandthelimitationsofsystematicevaluationofpastprograms,
economic research has been most valuable to policy. This progress has
emerged along three routes, (i) formulating the right questions, (ii) getting
access to highly informative data,and (iii) establishing causality.
First, before developing a specific research design, economists tend to ask a
series of preliminary questions. One aspect that they emphasize, next to the
definition of appropriate units of observation and the choice of relevant
outcome measures, is whether the program under scrutiny indeed had any
effect on the environment in which these decision units operate.Mandating a
change or disbursing money is not the same as actually providing substantive
treatment.Only an intervention exerting true change – to individuals’ human
capital,tofirms’laborcost,toregions’infrastructureetc.–canbesuccessfulin
altering the relevant outcomes.Most importantly,economic policy evaluation
concentrates on posing the appropriate counterfactual question, and on de-
riving a convincing answer from the available data.
Hence, second, access to informative data is a crucial condition for solid
economic policy advice. Most applied problems cannot be discussed exclu-
sively in the form of theoretical models, since their conclusions typically rest
on the signs or even precise magnitudes of key parameters that can only be
gathered from empirical data. Also other actors – such as the administrators
implementing the program, or the statistical offices – cannot generally be
relied upon to extract this information for the researchers,since complex em-
pirical problems typically require approaches that are tailor-made to the eval-
uation study, rather than one-size-fits-all. This fundamental requirement for
data to be useable for economic policy advice has led the most successful re-
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3 A comprehensive overview is given by Heckman et al. (1999); see also, among many others,
Schmidt (1999) or Blundell and Costas Dias (2000).search institutes today to engage in collecting and linking data,and even pro-
vidingdatatootherresearchers.Unfortunately,quitedifferentfromtheUSor




ically, the “gold standard” is arguably a randomized controlled trial. Yet, at
least in continental Europe it is all but impossible to realize random as-
signment of treatments5, as typically the policy side, politicians and adminis-
trators alike,are decidedly reluctant to do so.The argument raised most often
regards the ethical caveat,i.e.no person should be deliberately withheld from
a potentially beneficial treatment. Clearly, this point has more force in the
medical context, if e.g. the treatment is a drug against HIV/AIDS. Regarding
labor market programs, however, it is unlikely that the outcome without the
treatment is detrimental, since in continental Europe there is a comfortable
social safety net and negligible levels of absolute poverty6.
Another potential explanation for the political reluctance towards ran-
domized social experiments is that conducting experiments simply limits the
exertion of political influence.It is much more difficult to re-interpret results
from social experiments than the results of non-experimental studies.
Whereas the latter ones tend to be sensitive with regard to the concrete study
designchosenandarethereforealwayssubjecttoqualifications,resultsfroma
social experiment are easy to understand and easy to communicate. Conse-
quently, negative results from a non-experimental study may not prevent the
continuation of a program,but if experimental results spell out “failure”,this
will tend to kill the funding for it.
Traditionally,in the European Union policy makers displayed a relatively low
interest in having their interventions evaluated. This lacking “evaluation
culture” is changing gradually, though, and more and more countries have
some of their policies evaluated, a process frequently triggered by the Eu-
ropean Commission as a requirement on EU-co-financed programs (Kluve et
al. 2007). In Germany, the recent reforms of the labor market (“Hartz
reforms”) were the first policy measures for which the parliament explicitly
requested a thorough scientific evaluation of the effects of the reforms. In-
creasing public pressure has certainly helped in getting this change started,as
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4 There has been some progress, though, arising from the introduction of so-called
Forschungsdatenzentren that have the explicit task of providing researchers with access to se-
lected individual-level data sets.
5 Comprehensive surveys of the existing literature on the evaluation of labor market interven-
tions in Europe are Kluve and Schmidt (2002) and Kluve et al.(2007).
6 This might be different for the issue of relative poverty or,rather,income inequality.has the growing understanding of the limitations of traditional research
strategies among administrators.
If random assignment is not possible, researchers might find clever ways of
emulating a randomized controlled trial ex post. This approach exploits the
“natural experiment” introduced by events that are arguably exogenous to
treatment choice.There has been some inflationary use of this term in the lit-
erature, but in a sense, all observational studies need to ascertain that, given
that all the observable confounding factors are controlled for in the analysis,
assignment to treatment has been random,as it would have been in an experi-
mental study.If that is not the case,all that can be established with certainty in
an observational study are correlations.It is then up to the researcher to make
the case for identification assumptions that support a causal interpretation of
these correlations. Fortunately, we know much better today than in the past
how to construct a counterfactual convincingly from the data.
Given these methodological advances,how should economic policy advice be
organized?.Firstofall,tofulfillitspotential,economicresearchneedstobein-
dependent of vested interests. In Germany, this is ascertained for many insti-
tutions offering economic policy advice,most prominently for the universities
and the “large” research institutes gathered in the Leibniz Association
(WGL).But independence alone is not enough.Rather,if institutions want to
ensureasteadyflowofacademictalenttoappliedeconomicresearch,boththe
profession itself and the policy side need to treat publications in refereed
journals and good policy advice with equal respect. This is challenging, since
thequalityofpolicyadviceisoftendifficulttomeasure.Butonlythenwillthey
beabletofindtherightbalancebetweenacademicresearchandpolicyadvice.
To be successful in the long run, German universities and research institutes
need to educate new generations of government administrators. This will
improve the communication and the understanding between the policy side




the actions of all players in the market. This is what happened to the market
foreconomicpolicyadvice.Mostimportantly,increasingawarenessofthelim-
itations of empirical research has pushed the emphasis away from complex
mathematics towards a careful scrutiny of the underlying study design,that is,
towards the formulation of counterfactual questions and the issue of identifi-
cation. Although the modern methods of economic policy evaluation
originatemainlyinlaboreconomics,theyareapplicablemorebroadly.Recog-
nizing the potential of this different emphasis for improving the evaluation of
policyinterventionsnotonlyinthelabormarket,butalsoinhealth,education,
12 Christoph M. Schmidttheenvironment,andbasicallyallotherareas,inwhichgovernmentsintervene
into the functioning of the market, promises to lead to the design of better
policy7.
References
Blundell, R. and M. Costas Dias (2000), Evaluation Methods for Non-experimental
Data,Fiscal Studies 21:427–468.
Frondel, M. and C. M. Schmidt (2006), The Empirical Assessment of Technology Dif-




of Labor Economics vol.3,Amsterdam:North-Holland.
Kluve, J., D. Card, M. Fertig, M. Gora, L. Jacobi, P. Jensen, R. Leetmaa, L. Nima, E.
Patacchini,S.Schaffner,C.M.Schmidt,B.van der Klaauw ,A.Weber (2007),Active
Labor Market Policy in Europe: Performance and Perspectives, Springer: Berlin et
al.
Kluve, J. and C. M. Schmidt (2002), Can Training and Employment Subsidies Combat
European Unemployment? Economic Policy 35:411–448.
Manski,C.F.(1995),Identification Problems in the Social Sciences.Cambridge,MA,et
al.:Harvard University Press.
Ravallion, M. (2007), Evaluating Anti-Poverty Programs, forthcoming in: Evenson, R.
E.andT.P.Schultz(eds.),HandbookofDevelopmentEconomicsvol.4,Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Schmidt,C.M.(1999),Knowing What Works,IZA Discussion Paper No.77.
Schmidt, C. M. (2006), Fokus, Fokus, Fokus? Zur Rolle der außeruniversitären
Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitute,Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv 90:617–622.
Policy Evaluation and Economic Policy Advice 13
7 Recent discussions of these ideas address, for instance, poverty alleviation in the developing
world (Ravallion 2007) or energy policy (Frondel and Schmidt 2006).